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Robert W. Hefner
Modernity and the Challenge of Pluralism:
Some Indonesian Lessons
Abstraksi: Dalam tradisi ilmu-ilmu sosial Barat tumbuh suatupenger'
tian yang "kerds" tentdng sekularisasi: tersingkirnyd agdmd dari kehidu'
pan publik; agama hanya menjadi urusan pribadi masing'masing orang;
ia tidak punya perdn sosial yang berartL
Pandangan tersebut bersumber dari pengamaun tokoh'tokoh ilmu
sosial Barat aas gejala keagarnaan di Barat. Peran d'gdmd di sektor pub-
lik akan tersingkir dengan semakin mengudtnyd diferensiasi-fungsional
dalam masyarakat. Diferensiasi-fungsional ini akzn semakin kuat keti'
ka masyarakat semakin modern. Di samping itu rnodernisasi yang ber'
langsung dalam suatu mdsyarakat sangat bertumpu pada budaya yang
sangdt menjunjung tingi peran akal hinga tumbuh ilmu pengeahuan
dan teknologi modern. Iptek inilah yangmenentukan tingkat moderni-
tzs suatu masyarakat. Semmura itu agama difahami sebagai sesuatu yang
irrasional, dan karena itu bertenangan dengan tuntutan rasionalisasi
masyarakat moduen. Semakin moderen sudtu masydrakat, maka ia akan
semakin meningalkan agama. Agama akan meniadi semakin kurang
berperan. Kalaupun berperan, perannya tersebut terbatas hanya pada
urusan in diztidu m asin g-m asin g.
Pengertian sekularisasi yang berdasar atds pengdlaman masyarakat
Barat seperti itu apakah juga berlaku pada masyarakzt Islam?
Menurut penulis tidak. Kalaupun konsep sekularisasi digunakan in-
telektual Muslim, pengertiannya berbeda. Sekularisasi lebih difahami se'
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bagai upaya meleakkan seclrrA tepat mdna yang sakrdl dan mana yang
profan, mand. ydng kudus dan mana yang dunialoi. Dalam Islam, ini
rntrupdkan konsE monoteisme murnl, tawhid. Dalam hlam,yd.ngsakral
dipahami sebagai realitas lebib abstrak, bukan sebagai kekuawn ghaib
yang menjelma dalam realias duniawi, sEerti padabenda-benda, rum-
buhan, binatang, manusia, dan lembaga-lembaga sosial. Sekularisasi
dalam Iskm adalah penolakan aas sakralitas realitas duniawi ini, bu-
kan menolak a"danya yang sakral. Juga bukan berarti menolak peran
agdmd di sektor publik. Agama dapat buperan sebagai sumber nilai bagi
masyarakat.
Sekularisasi dakm pengertidn itu tidak membuat Islam anti moder-
nitas, ilmu pengeuhuan, dan teknologi. Karena itu, sekularisasi yang
dialami masyarakat Barat, seperti digambarkan oleh para teoritisi seku-
larisasi selama ini, tidak berkku bagi masyarakzt klam. Setidaknya, teori
sekukrisasi yang "keras" harus dirnisi ketika dihadapkan dengan ke-
nydtdzn yang berkembang dalam maryarakat Islam.
Tuntutan bagi reoisi tersebut sdngat kuat ketika memperhatikan pe-
ngalaman-pengalaman umat Islarn Indonesia yang sedang mengalami
tzntangdn modernias seperti masldrakat kin di bekhan duniaini. Umat
I s lam In done sia sec ara kre dtif te kh mengembangkzn pemikiran keis larn -
an dalam rangka modernias dan masyarakat Indonesia yang plurdl se-
cara keagamant. Telah tumbuh di Indonesia suatu kubur keislaman yang
dapat mengakomodasi tantangan modcrnias dan pluralias keagdmdan.
Pemikiran ini sangat nampak pada kelompok pembaru pa"da masa Orde
Baru ini, terutzma dimotori oleh Nurcbolish Madjid.
Gagasan sekularisasi aau desakralisasi kaum pembaru Islam Indone-
sia telah membuat Islam tidak identik dengan kelompok-kelompok so-
sial-po litik tertentu. hlam rz kh wbebas dai koffi k-konflik polirik hi n gga
bi sa diteri m a o leh um at I s km sec ar a le bi h luas. Kate gori - kate gori priy ayi,
santri, dan abangan, yang digunakan CWrd Gemz untuk membeda-
kan orientasi keagamaan di kakngan kaum Muslim Jaua, sekzrang sudah
tidak relevan lagi digunakan. Priyayi dan abangan sekarang sudah me-
lebur ke dalam kuhur keagamazn sanvi. Sekarang sedang berlangsung
apd yang disebut sebagai "santrinisasi" Atat! "Islamisasi" di Indonesia.
Ini berlangsung dalam masyarakat Indonesia yang sedang menjadi se-
makin moderm, di mana kelas menengah semakin kuzt. Islam telah men-
jadi kubur kelas menengah ini. Modernias bergandengan dengan Islam.
Di Indonesia, kkm juga dapat mmgakomodasi anangan pluralius,yang
merupakan sisi lain dari modernitas. Islam telah berperan positif bagi
kehidupan ne gara-ban gsa Indone sia.
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here are times when world events undergo such rapid and mas-
sive transformation that they challenge our sense of history
and of our likely future. 'We are living through one of these
periods of intensely destabilizing change right now. The collapse of
communism in eastern Europe, the international drive for democra-
tization, the clamor over human rights, the contest between secular-
ist and religious visions of government and society 
-these and other
things have forced observers in many societies to wonder whether
there are not important commonalities to social development in our
era.
In raising this issue, of course, we reopen a Pandora's box of unre-
solved questions concerning what is variable and what general in his-
tory and human experience. Can cultures be compared? Are modern
societies developing in a convergent direction? Is it possible to talk
about human rights across cultures? And, most relevant for my con-
cern today, can we say that the modern era brings with it seculariza-
tion or some other cross-culturally similar process of religious trans-
formation?
Not since the years following Vorld Var tr have such broadly
comparative issues been in the air. At that time, Western social scien-
tists were confident that one could talk about a general or worldwide
process of social and culture modernization. Modernization theory
dominated the social sciences and lVestern understandings of mod-
ern social change. During the late 1960s and 1970s, however, the "or-
thodox consensus" (Giddens 1984:xv) that underlay this perspective
collapsed, and with it went agreement on the idea that there are broad
commonalities to history and modernity. During the 1980s and 1990s,
no analytic orthodoxy succeeded in reimposing itself in the 'Western
social sciences, but there was growing skepticism about universalist
preachments. Earlier characterizations in contemporary societies were
subjected to critical deconstruction. Universalism seemed to give way
to relativist affirmations of the incommensurability of cultures and
the playful, even ironic, indeterminacy of modern social change.
It is against this background of relativist and generalist ferment
that I want to ask whether recent research allows us to say that secu-
larization is intrinsic to modern social development. For the moment
let me note that by "secularization" I mean the process whereby do-
mains of social activity and human experience previously organized
around religious norms are "desacralized by their reinterpretation
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in terms of ideals and practices of a less directly sacral nature (cf.
'Wilson 1935). This issue is not merely academic, of course, but has
very practical implications for the question of what role religion should
play in government, the economy, and the public order generally.
The topic of secularization has also been c.ontroversial among Indo-
nesian Muslim intellectuals, where scholars such asNurcholish Madjid
have suggested that a measure of secularization or auhid-inspired
"desacralization" is not merely inevitable but deeply necessary for
Islam's religious and social vitality.
To assess these questions, then, I will in the first part of this paper
return to earlier discussions and examine what was meant by secular-
ization and why it was thought intrinsic to modernity. This exercise
reveals that, though many'Western scholars have seen secularization
as a feature of modernity, their analysis has at times been compro-
mised by two questionable views: an unjustifiably narrow understand-
ing of religion as a system of private belief rather than (in addition) a
way of life, and the tendency to identify aspects of religious change
in the tVest (and only some of the Vest, at that) with what is univer-
sal in the modern era.
Heaving briefly examined aspects of secularization theory, I want
in the next part of this paper to raise the question as to how religious
change in the modern Muslim world compares with that of the Vest.
In particular, I want to ask whether the Muslim world is the 'great
exception" to secularization, as Ernest Gellner has recently argued
(Gellner 199278), in that it alone among the world's core civiliza-
tions "totally and effectively defies the secularization thesis". I will
examine this question not from the perspecrive of general theory
alone but in relation to religion and politics here in the mosr popu-
lous of majority-Muslim societies, Indonesia. As Gellner would pre-
dict, recent developments in Indonesia seem at first to defy rhe
secularization thesis and suggest that Islam is a "great exception."
At a deeper level, however, developmenrs in Indonesian Islam re-
mind us that, though the universal preachments of the secularization
thesis itself are deeply flawed, there are in fact important affinities
between the challenges faced in the Muslim world and those encoun-
tered in the \fest. In particular, historical comparison suggesrs rhar
one of the central challenges to religion in both regions is the ques-
tion of how to respond to the pluralism of the modern world. The
manner in which believers in both traditions resoond to this chal-
Strdia Islamiha, Vol. 2, Na 4, 1995
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lenge can certainly vary 
-Pluralism is, in any case' general to our
era. In the case of Indonesia, moreover, the options being Pursued
for the management of pluralism could well provide important les-
sons not merely for the Muslim world but for the '!(est as well.
Secularization Theory Revisited
Secularization theory is less a theory in the technical sense of the
word that it is a loosely structured set of assumptions as to the con-
tours of religious development in the modern era. Vhat is most re-
markable about these assumptions is less their analytic rigor or depth
of insight than their breadth of appeal. Despite the great differences
that separate these approaches, secularization assumptions in the V'est
filtered into each of this century's great schools of social thought:
marxist, liberal, and postmodernist.
The "inherited model" (\Vilson 1985) of seculatization theory drew
most directly on the works of Emile Durkheim and Max 'Weber.
From Durkheim, the model adapted its structural model of societal
modernization, with its assumption that modern development invol-
ves the increasing differentiation and specialization of social struc-
tures. In this view, commerce and, later, industrialization bring about
a growing division of labor, and this in turn promotes a generalized
"differentiation" (separation and specialization) of social institutions.
Kinship, politics, education, and employment all separate from their
original primordial unity and assume a dizzyrngvariety of complex,
more specialized, forms. Societies are thereby transformed from
simple, homogeneous collectivities into the pluralistic entities we as-
sociate with modernity today.
According to Durkheim and later secularization theorists, this pro-
cess of structural functional differentiation involves not just adjust-
ments in social organization but the fragmentation or piuralization
of life-worlds, meanings, and experience. Where previously there was
a "sacred canopy" (Berger 1967) stabilizing life experience and pro-
viding a basis for shared meaning, in modern times the canopy is rent
and the collective bases of morality and identity are diminished or
lost. Unlike the German philosopher Nietzsche (and many
postmodern theorists who reference him for their works), Durkheim
believed that this loss of religion 'was but a temporary dysfunction of
early modernization. No society can survive without a collective
moial consciousness, he thought, and eventually a new' though largely
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secular, "civil religion" would emerge to play the role earlier assumed
by religion. Centered on Durkheim's "cult of the individual", this
civil religion would provide coherence and stability even in the ab-
sence of a theistic canopy.
The idea of civil religion was central to Durkheim's views on secu-
larization, and, with the related concept of "civic culture", played a
role in models of modernity developed by such leading figures as
Edward Shils (1961), Robert Bellah (Bellah 1975; Bellah and Hammond
1980), and, early in his career, Clifford Geertz (1973). Most versions
of secularization theory, however, relegated the civil religion theme,
with its image of a secular (or lightly secularized) equivalent to tradi-
tional religion, to a secondary role. These approaches looked beyond
Durkheim to the sociologist Maxlil(eber and the German philoso-
pher, Freidrich Nietzsche. Like them, this version of secularization
ih.ory adopted a bleaker perspecrive on the prospects for the reconsti-
tution of a civic morality in the modern era. Borrowing from Ve-
ber's ideas on instrumental rationalization, these models emphasized
that science, technology, and modern capitalism have not merely
worked to differentiate our world, as Durkheim implied, but also to
depersonalize and "disenchant" it. Having used a religious ethic to
help institutionalize capitalism and bureaucratic government, mod-
ern Western society in the twentieth century has decided that it can
work quite well without religious buttressing. In the view of this
version of secularization theory, modernity's challenge to religion
and civic morals is more severe than Durkheim had imagined.
In-short, though one wing of secularization theory remained opti-
mistic about the prospects for a reconstituted moral consciousness in
the modern world, the other echoed Veber and Nietzsche in affirm-
ing modernity's destabilization of all religious and foundational cer-
titudes. Though during the 1960s and 1970s secularization theory
vacillated between these Durkheimian and'sileberian poles, recent
social theorists in the tVest have tended to favor the Veberian or
Nietzschean view of the irrecoverable fragmentation of live-worlds
bringing about the demise of religion. There are, of course' other,
less main line theories of religious modernization among Vestern
scholars, some of which affirm the potential for spirituality even in a
postmodern age (Berger 1992; Cox1990).'What is so intriguing about
ihe secularizationtradition, however, is the ease with which it moved
from a modest or "neutral" view of religion to an extreme or even
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hostile one. The modest version affirmed that with society's struc-
rural-functional differentiation (or some equally radical process of
live-world pluralization), the scope of religious institutions and mean-
ings is progressively narrowed, until both are made a matter of pri-
vate, individual belief rather than publicly-enforced morality. This
view of the inevitable "privatization" of modern religion is clearly
expressed in the work of one of the most eminent secularization theo-
rists, the British sociologist Bryan Vilson:
"The secularization thesis implies the privatization of religion, its continu-
ing operation in the public domain becomes confined to a lingering rethorical
invocation in support of conventional moraliry and human decency and
dignity 
-^s a cry of despair in the face of moral panic" (!(ilson 1985:19).
As this quote itself unwittingly illustrates, it is a slippery slope
from a soft secularizationthesis to a hard one. Many Western writers
move quickly, almost unthinkingly, from generalizations about the
desacralization of the public and the pluralization of beliefs to gener-
alizations about the "irrationality" and inevitable decline of religion.
Thus Wilson (1985:18) describes religion as "deep-laid in man's es-
sential irrationality" and implies that it is only because of this "essen-
tial irrationality" that the inexorable progress of secularization has
not advanced further. On the evidence of a country like the United
States, where the great majority of citizens continue to profess a reli-
gious faith (V'uthnow 1988), this charact erizaion of religion as irra-
tional and in inevitable decline seems curious at the very least. But it
was typical of the tendency among early secularization theorists 
-
and miny Western intellectuals generally- to confuse the analysis of
modern religion with their own secularist world views.
Islam and Secularization: the Great Exception?
Given the severity of many secularization forecasts, it is not sur-
prising that 'Western observers have been perplexed by the phenom-
enon of modern Islam. \ilhile the Judeo-Christian tradition is repre-
sented (much too simplistically) as in irreversible decline, religion in
the Muslim world seems as vibrant as ever. Ernest Gellner aPtly sum-
marizes this paradox:
"It is possible to disagree about the extent, homogeneity, or irreversibil-
ity of this trend [i.e., secularization]..'; but, by and large, it would seem
reasonable to say that it is real. But there is one very real, dramatic and
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conspicuous exception to all this: Islam. To say rhat secularization prevails
in Islam is not conrenrious. It is simply false. Islam is as strong now as ir was
a century ago. In some ways, ir is probably much stronger" (Gellner 199225).
Other, equally distinguished observers of the Muslim world come
to similar conclusions. Thus, for example, rhe respected sociologist
Bassam Tibi has wrirten exrensively on Islam and secularization. In
his view, secularizarion is inevitabli in modern industrial society. In-
voking models inspired by modernization theory, he attributes this
development to the functional differentiation of social structures (Tibi
t988:727). When he turns ro rhe Muslim world, Tibi observes rhar
Islamist political theorists insist on a "congruence berween the sacred
and the political' (131). Such a view, Tibi goes on ro argue, represenrs
a preindustrial, "organic" view of religion and politics incompatible
with the modern era's demand for autonomy and functional special-
izar.ion. Citing the European experience, in which Protestantism was
"primarily domiciled within the sphere of interiorit y" (pt.I39), he ends
by predicting, "The future of Islam seems to lie in a parallel direc-
tion." Thus what began as an oversimplified, indeed distorted, under-
standing of religion's fate in the Vest is quietly generalized ro rhe
Muslim world.
While Ernest Gellner agrees with Tibi in seeing Islam as out-of-
step with what he believes are the secularizing and privarizing im-
peratives of the modern world, he is much less optimistic about the
Iong-term prospecrs for the kind of change Tibi envisions. Modern
Islam, Gellner insists, has a social organization and ideology unique
among the world religions in its ability to adapt ro rhe challenges and
opportunities of modern developmenr. More particularly, Gellner
asserts, modern Islam has been able to play a role akin to that of
ethno-nationalism in the'West, but with quire different consequences
for religion. In the'West, Gellner argues, nineteenth 
-and early rwen-tieth- century nationalism revived and idealized, thus ultimately
transforming, popular ethnic culture. Though in some Western coun-
tries (such as Ireland, Poland, and Spain) religion played a role in
nationalist movements, in most of the lVest, Gellner notes, national-
ism emphasized folk culture rarher than Christendom at its core value
complex. In this manner ir displaced Christianiry from its role as the
key emblem of European political identity.
Like Christianity, Gellner continues, Islam too had long been split
into a high and low variant. The high tradition was associated with
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the trans-ethnic and trans-political clerisy of.'ukmh', while the low
or folk tradition was grounded on kinship politics and localized shrines
to Muslim saints (Gellner 1987:75-76). Throughout history the two
traditions flowed into and influenced each other. Periodically, how-
ever, they also erupted into conflict, when reformers "revived the
alleged pristine zeal of the high culture, and united tribesmen in the
interests of purification and of their own enrichment and political
advancemen{ Qbid). Vith its industries, education, and, above all,
powerful state, the modern era, Gellner argues, has irreversibly al-
tered this "flux and reflux" (Gellner 1987;199274) between localiza-
tion and universalizing reform. Today, modernizing reformists iden-
tify the folk variant of Islam as the source of the Muslim world's
backwardness. In reformers'eyes, Gellner claims, the twin challenges
of modernization and 'Western dominance demand that this back-
ward tradition be replaced once and for all with a purified, high Is-
lam. Only through such a total-cultural revolution can the Muslim
world restore its lost glory and propel itself into the modern era.
For Gellner, Islam is unique among the world's historic religions
"in that it allows the use of a pre-industrial great tradition of a clarisy
as the national, socially pervasive idiom and belief of a new style
community" (Gellner 1983:81). lVhereas in the'Western world the
rise of the modern state diminished Christianity's role in political
life, in the Muslim world nation-state development has revitalized
religion. Though Gellner shies away from making social forecasts,
he hints that things are not likely to change in the near future. "So
far," he comments, "there is no indication that it flslam] will suc-
cumb to secularization in the future either" (1992:18).
Islam and Pluralism in Indonesia
I want to put aside for the moment the question of whether
Gellner's general characterization of secularization is right (I think it
is not), and shifting focus a bit, examine this problem of the Putative
"exceptionalism" of the Muslim world in the light of Indonesian Is-
lam. Indonesia is rather far from the historic heartland of the Muslim
world, but it is the most populous of Muslim nations and, over the
past two centuries, has experienced movements of political and reli-
gious reform like those known in other parts of the Muslim world.
For the sake of brevity, I will limit my empirical illustrations to re-
cent history and to just one portion of the vast Indonesian archi-
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pelago, the island of Java, where some 60 per cent of Indonesians
live.
The standard characterization of Javanese Islam is that provided
by Clifford Geertz in his, The Religion of Jaaa. 'Whatever its short-
comings, which are many, this work succeeds at capturing the ex-
traordinary pluralism ofJavanese Islam in the 1950s and the forces
animating its change. Geertz identified three strains of Javanese Is-
lam: the abangan or folk varianr, which he saw as a ritualistic me-
lange of indigenous, Hindu and Muslim elements; the santri or more
normatively "orthodox" varianr of Islam; and the yiyaN or arisro-
cratic variant, which Geertz saw as deeply influenced by Java's ear-
lier Hindu-Buddhism.
Marshall Hodgson $97a:551) and, more recenrly, Mark V'oodward
(1989) have demonstrated that in distinguishing'Hindu-Buddhist"
from Islamic elements in Javanese religion Geenz used an unjustifiably
narrow conception of Islam. As a result, much of what he regarded as
Hindu-Buddhist is more properly understood as derived from popu-
lar Sufism and courtly sryles of polity and devotion adapted from
Indo-Persian Islamic precedents. For the purposes of our presenr dis-
cussion, however,.whether Geerrz's analysis is philologically on mark
is of secondary importance ro what his work, and that of his team-
mate on the "Modjokuro" research project, Robert Jay (1963,1969),
reveals as to the dynamics of Islamic reform in the mid-twentieth
century. Conducting their research at a time when Indonesia had
one of the freest parliamentary democracies in all Asia, Geertz and
Jay describe a situation in which class and ideological conflicrs were
supercharged with religious antagonisms pitting abangan Javanists,
who tended to support Indonesia's nationalist and communist par-
ties, against santri Muslims. Though religious issues were but one
influence on this bitter polarizarion, the conflict, with its politicization
of religion, had serious implications for the narure of religious change
in modern Indonesia.
The more properly religious dimension of this political conflict
often pitted abangan traditionalists, with their cults of local saints
and revered ancestors, against santri ref.ormers who wanted nothing
but to replace what they regarded as polytheistic deviations with de-
votional worship of a unitary Alllh (God). Muslim reformers also
criticized spirit-mediums, magicians, healers, herbalists, and any one
else who appeared to traffic in magical powers or tutelary spirits.
Reports from other times and places inJava painr a similar portrait of
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a Muslim drive againsr rural Javanist traditions (Hefner 1987,1990;
Pranowo LggL). Forty years after Geertz and Jay's research, we can
now assess the results of this reformation effort. The evidence is com-
pelling and clear: the reformist efforts were astoundingly successful,
iupprlssi.rg heterodox cults and canalizing popular spirituality away
fro- the iujildt panrheism once characteristic of folk Javanese reli-
gion and inio more tauhtdic or monotheistic devotional forms.
thorrgh, by comparison with other Muslim societies, Javanese Islam
tod.y"r.-rins reharkably pluralistic, there can be no question that
reformist Muslims harre catiied out nothing less than a great transfor-
mation, bringing popular religion into closer conformity with nor-
mative Islam (Pranowo 1991).
Is this secularization? Clearly if our ideas on secularization are
based on the "hard" version ofthe thesis that I described above, this
is not secularization at all, but simply a delegitimation of old reli-
gious practices and the sacralization of orhers. Religion has. not been
6"rirhed ro rhe realm ofthe personal, exposed as "essentially irratio-
nal" (to invoke \vilson's rrnhappy phrase), or pushed down the slip-
p.ry rlop. toward inevitable extinction. On the contrary' while at-
iacking ipirit cults and shamans, Muslim reformers promote mosque
attendln.. and other convenrional expressions of Islamic piety. From
a normative Islamic perspective, the Javanese aPPear more religious
than ever.
If, however, whar we mean by secularization is more the 
*soft"
secuiarization to which I referred earlier, with its pluralization of
meaning sysrems and the desacralization of domains previously spiri-
tualized] f think it is fairly clear that the efforts of Islamic reformers
contain elemenrs rhat resemble a good deal of ou-r phenomenon of
secularization, or some general process hidden within this troubled
concepr. In atiacking thi worship of guardian spirits, belittling the
spiritual efficacy of aicestors, andiontesting_the morality of all forms
of 
-rgic, Muslim reformers have desarralized domains that previously
fell uider the spell of magical and spiritist technique, and relocated
divinity to a higier o,. 
-ot. abstract plane of experience..In so.doing,
the reformerc hr,r. created a Wuhtdic ethic more general or abstract
than the one rhey displaced in the way it explains and controls things
like curing, agriculture, and human destiny'
l.t ,n."e*ilain this last point, because it is central to our task of
distinguishing *hat is useful and what is mistaken in earlier versions
of seJularizaiion theory. This process whereby worldly acts are
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desacralized and divine agency is relocated away from the immediacy
of individual instances of curing, cultivating, etc., is, I believe, a rela-
tively common feature of modern change in the world religions,
though it is often mischaracterized in secularization theories that
equate secularization with the decline of religion entirely. Like an
earlier Christian reformation, Islamic reform does not disenchant the
world, but distances its spiritual agency from the immediacy of spe-
cific, this-worldly space-rime events. Rather than a cure being achieved
because a spirit can be cajoled ro inrervene, blessing comes ro rhose
who live in the way of an all powerful, but also more remore, Allah.
Though theorists from the hard-secularization school may have
difficulty distinguishing this kind of change of religious consciousness
from the desacralization-slipping-into-disbelief rhat they emphasize,
the difference is profound. By coming ro conceive of God in more
abstract terms 
-for example, as an all powerful creator ultimately
responsible for all that exists but not "in" the world in the immediate
and responsive fashion that, say, an animist spirit is- this "sofr" secu-
larization or desacralization can coexist with other, more empirical
vehicles of explanation and conrrol. In particular, like post-Reforma-
tion Christianity, Islamic reform opens itself to natural science and
sees no conflict berween scientific technique and religious belief.
The kind of change promoted by Muslim reformers that I am
describing here, of course, is a vital preadaptation for the open and
empirically-oriented world view somerimes referred to as modern or
scientific rationality. In as much as this kind of change has taken
place in much of the Muslim world, which I believe it has, it also
bears a striking resemblance ro rhe earlier efforts of Christian and
post-Christian philosophers to carve our a space for empirical sci-
ence by insisting that the book of nature was as legitimate away to
God as the Book of Revelation (Casanova 7993:24). Thus, like their
Christian counterparts in the early modern era, modernist Muslims
throughout the world have little difficulty accepring the legitimacy
or importance of modern medical science; indeed, th-ey pr.fJr ir over
localized magical traditions. 'Whether, in fact, we want ro continue
to use the term "secularization" to refer to this type of religious change
is not as great a concern for me as the recognition that religious ratio-
nalization like this has occurred in many parts of the modern world.
'Whether we want to call it "secularization" or not, we see here a
striking convergence in modern religious experience.
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If from one perspective Islam in modern Indonesia has been a pow-
erful agent of something that resembles what used to be called secu-
larization (or, if you will, "desacralization and abstraction"), from
another perspective Muslims seem to be working for something dif-
ferent. In the 1950s, the highly-charged and politicized drive for Is-
lamic revitalization focused not just on the uwhtdic repudiation of
parochial healing cults and shrine worship, but on efforts to Islamize
Indonesia's political and economic institutions. During the first or
"Old Order' period of Indonesian independence, some Muslim po-
litical parties militated for the establishment of an Islamic star.e (negara
Iskm). Failing that, others in the leadership hoped that, at the very
least, the national government would enforce the so-called "Jakarta
charter." The latter statement had originally been included in the
1945 declaration of independence, but was subsequently dropped af-
ter protests from Indonesia's Christian and Hindu minorities (Boland
1982).According to the charter, the government was to work lo"carry
out" Qnenjalankan) Islamic law (shart'ah) among the Muslim portion
of the Indonesian populace. In other words, rather than building a
high wall between church and state, Muslim reformers sought to link
them with a sturdy, stable bridge.
The effort to achieve an Islamic state was opposed, of course, by
some in the Muslim leadership, as well as the leadership of the Indo-
nesian Nationalist and Communist Parties. Supercharged by a dete-
riorating economic situation, the struggle between Muslim parties
and the communists came to a tragic climax during 7965-1966. Then,
in the aftermath of a failed left-wing officers' coup, Muslim organiza-
tions joined forces with the military to strike at the Indonesian Com-
munist Party (Cribb 1990; Hefner t990). Though the motives that
fueled the killing were varied, some Muslim political organizations
sacralized the campaign against the communists, a few even calling it
a holy struggle or jihid.
From this abbreviated historical account, we can see that, what-
ever may have been occurring in the realms of medicine and spirit
worship, Muslim politics was not animated by a unitary
desacralization of the mundane. On the contrary, some Muslim poli-
ticians saw themselves as engaged in a holy struggle to recapture the
Indonesian nation from'their secularist and atheistic rivals. On the
surface, then, the Muslim campaign conformed rather nicely to
Gellner's vision of modern Islam. A purified high Islam was posed in
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opposition to the corrupred low Islam of the abangan community.
Rejecting communism, secularism, and Western liberalism, political
klam was to provide a basis for the revival and redirection of the
nation.
The efforts of political Islam did nor end, of course, with the de-
struction of the Communist party.In the aftermath of. 7965-1966, the
government announced that its first priority was rhe political and
economic stabilization of the counrry. It moved quickly ro resrrict
the activities of political parties, including Muslim ones. In the face
of government restriction on political Islam, the Muslim communiry
split into several camps, some supporring cooperarion with the gov-
ernment and others favoring opposition. One debate which ensued
among Muslim intellectuals is interesting for our purposes, because it
came to focus on the highly charged quesrion as to whether the mod-
ernization of Islam required its "secularization" (sekularisasi) (Ivladjid
1987). Several leaders called for an innovative program of Islamic
"renewal" Qtembaruan). They criticized the identificarion of Islam
with party politics, implying that the earlier poliricization of hlam
(through its association with formal political parties) had only un-
dermined popular piety. The campaign for aMuslim srare, rhey added,
confused a profane preoccuparion with a sacred one.
There is nothing in scripture, rhese critics argued, to indicate that
Muslims must struggle to create an Islamic state. Hence this and other
mundane political initiatives must be viewed in a new light 
-they
must be "secularized." In a limited sense, Madiid and others meanr
that Muslim should repudiate all forms of partisanship that confuse
mundane goals with sacral ones and shift their attention ro more
properly religious affairs. More generally, however, rhe renewal
groups' call for secularization was a bold affirmation of their belief
that the Muslim response ro rhe modern situation must include a
struggle to live with, and respond ro, Indonesia's pluralism.
As we all know, this appeal for secularization provoked disbelief
among some in the Muslim community. The intellecrual mosr closely
associated with this call for secularizing renewal, Nurcholish Madjid,
was attacked for trying ro rransform Islam into what one Muslim
critic called a "spiritual personalist ethical sysrem" akin, it was claimed,
to modern 'Western Christianity (Hassan 7982:774,123). Madjid and
his followers took care ro emphasize that they rejecred the ideology
of. secukrism, with its privatization of religion, while supporring
secukrization construed as the desacralizationof things wrongly sacral-
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ized. But.their critics countered that any move toward secularization
violates the very essence of Islam . Islam is a "total way of life," they
said, and, unlike Christianity, provides clear norms as to how law
and society should be organized. To talk of secularization is thus to
abandon the social and ethical totality demanded by Islam.
Though Madjid's influence temporarily declined following this
controversy, the government's wariness toward politicization of re-
ligion made any kind of mass-based mobilization difficult during the
I97Os and 1980s. As a result, whether they agreed with the
"desacralizers" or not, most of the Muslim leadership channelled their
energies during these years away from party politics into Programs
of social and educational reform. It is clear that many prominent
figures in the Muslim community, like Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo,
Djohan Effendi, and Abdurrahman V'ahid, saw these efforts at reli-
gious education and social reform as the ProPer focus for a pluralistic
Islam that had renounced once and for all the ideal of an Islamic
state. Others outside this leadership, however, may have seen these
non-political initiatives as a kind of temporizing strategy, designed to
win time and support.
It would take me beyond the confines of the Present Paper to
describe events during the 1970s and 1980s in any detail (see Hefner
L993). For the purposes of our present discussion, let me say simply
that the "depoliticization" of Islam coupled with the Muslim effort
to deepen mass piety had, by the late 1980s, proved a brilliant suc-
cess. The Muslim leadership's forswearing of. party politics calmed
the nerves of officials opposed to the politicization of religion. At the
same time, and with the support of the Department of Religion, the
Muslim community was able to embark on a bold program of cul-
tural and religious revival. It doubled the number of mosques in the
country in just ten years, introduced religious education into the
public schools, established a network of teacher-training colleges
which graduated thousands of religious teachers, and, in brief, re-
versed the decline in Muslim piety that had resulted from the
politicization of Islam in the Old Order period. For those of us famil-
iar with the Indonesia of an earlier era, the results of all this cam-
paign have been astonishing. Today, Indonesia's public culture is far
more Islamic than it was in the 1950s and public piety much greater.
The very ascent of this politically low-profile, cultural Islam has
changed Indonesia's political culture, creating a Muslim middle class
with greater initiative and influence than at 
^ny 
time in the New
Sttdia klamiba, Vol, 2, No. 4, 1995
38 Robert lV Hefner
Order era. As Islamization brings more and more people ro piery, ir
is inevitable and, in fact, importanr rhar Muslims and non-Muslims
reconsider the role of religion in public life. Just as such discussions
have shaped the role of religion in the V'est 
-in ways far more var-ied than modernization theory once acknowledged- they will here
in Indonesia as well.
Conclusion: the Challenge of Pluralism
By way of conclusion, let me return to my earlier comments on
secularization and determine just what the Indonesian example can
tell us, first, about pluralism, secularization, and modern r.ligiout
change, and second about whether or not Islam constitutes, as Gellner
argued, a "great exception" to modern processes of religious change.
The first and most general comment we can make is that, when
examined closely, the processes that might correspond most directly
to what classically-trained Western theorists call seculari zation are a
good deal more complex than generalizations about "structural dif-
ferentiation" imply. Here in Indonesia, it is not at all clear rhar "srruc-
tural differentiation" or a growing division of labor has been the pri-
mary engine of secularization. Yes, Muslim reformists 
-incidentally,like their Hindu counrerparrs in neighboring Bali (Bakker I9g3)-
express support for modern science and criticize magic and spirit cults.
Their criticism represenrs a kind of secularization 
-in our limited
sense of the desacralization of mundane things in conjunction with
the maintenance of a still-strong commirmenr ro an overarching di-
vinity. And in some round-about way rhis development can be traced
back to the achievement of modern science and an industrial division
of labor. For the most part, however, to the degree that it has oc-
curred at all, this desacralization has been promoted in advance of a
thorough-going transformation of the Indonesian economy or its di-
vision of labor. It has been pioneered by religious reformers, narion-
alist politicians, military officers, educarors, and others distinguished
not so much by their role in an industrial division of labor, but by
their participation in the political and moral project to create a mod-
ern Indonesia. To put the matter in two-polar terms, one could say
that the process of modern religious change here has been more deci-
sively affected by the struggle for a modern narion than it has secular-
izatio n theory's "structural differentiation".
Vhether in Indonesia or the West, the "inherited model" in secu-
larization theory, with its Durkheimian emphasis on economic dif-
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ferentiation, tends to overlook this more complex play of forces. In
both regions, modern religious change has in fact been deeply shaped
by religion's role in the life of the nation as much or more than it has
economic change. Though classical secularization theory tended to
overlook this fact, this same influence was decisive even in the devel-
opment of modern religion in the Vest. This can be seen in the fact
that'Western societies like France and England institutionalized very
a different relationship between Church and state in the early mod-
ern era despite having achieved similar levels of economic develop-
ment. The critical influence on religion in public life was not the
economy alone, then, but the relationship of religion to government
and civil society.
Let me illustrate this with a brief reference to the varied role of
religion in Western Europe. In France, we know, a monopolistic
Roman Catholic clerical establishment opted in the pre-Republican
era for a strong alliance with the royalist state; it used this alliance, in
turn, to suppress religious pluralism, especially that of the Protestant
Huguenots, who were hunted down and killed. As so often happens
in human history, however, this apparent gesture of strength 
-which
involved the sacralization of an all-too-human political establish-
ment- proved over the long run to weaken religion in French civil
life. Identified as it was with a repressive and monolithic state system,
the Church's policies guaranteed that later popular struggles for po-
litical reform would show an equally monolithic hostility to the clergy
and all religion. Herein lies the origins of the "laic" [secularist] tradi-
tion which, to this day, is such a strong influence on French national
life 
-an influence visible in the French government's continuing oP-position to such issues as the rights of young Muslim girls to wear
veils (hijilb) to school. As David Martin (1978) has noted, this same
pattern of a religious polarization, pitting an often quite conservative
religious establishment with strong ties to the state against radical
anticlerics hostile to religion in public life, was also once prominent
in Spain and some other parts of the Latin-Catholic world.
But patterns of religiosity in the West are far more diverse than
modernization theories have often implied.In contrast with France,
the Church of England was also an "established" (state-backed, and
official) religion and at times its leadership had aspirations every bit
as monopolistic, and bloody, as its French Catholic counterpart'
Catholics and disident Protestants ftnown as "nonconformists") were
at times hunted down and killed. At a certain critical moment in its
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development, however, the Church had to decide what to do with
Protestant dissenters who rejected the legitimacy of. the Church of
England. Rather than choosing to suppress pluralism, the Church
balked and ended up tolerating it. The stand-off berween establish-
ment supporters and their anti-establishment rivals was long and at
times difficult. In the end, however, rhe failure of England's rulers
and Church leaders to push for a decisive suppression of Catholics
and Protestant nonconformists created a free space conducive to plu-
ralism and religious dissent. This tradition of tolerating religious dis-
sent provided, in turn, a precedent for more general forms of plural-
ism and tolerance. This same tradition of religion-within-pluralism
would be institutionalized in an even more vigorous form in the United
States.
The point here is that, in England as in all of Europe, the precise
role of religion in government and society was much more complex
than is implied in modernization theory and many commenraries in
'Western political theory. Here, as in the contemporaryMuslim world,
the process whereby religious institutions and values were (or were
not) woven into the fabric of modern national life varied widely;
more specifically, the role of religion in public life was deeply af-
fected by the decisions religious and political elites made in the face
of religious pluralism and dissent. \flhile "established" churches which
suppressed pluralism may have worked in the shorr run to defend
religious institutions, over the long run they often generated a deep
hostility on the part of some in the broader public roward religion
itself. It is no coincidence that it is in Europe's Medirerranean Catho-
lic countries that one finds some of the srrongesr traditions of secu-
larist anti-clericalism. Conversely, the nation with the strongest and
most pluralistic tradition of religious "disestablishmenr" in the Vest,
the United State, is also the one with the most vibrant religious life
today. On this evidence, it would seem thar a judicious measure of
religious tolerance can, in some instances, work to deepen rather
than weaken the influence of religious institutions in society as a
whole.
A similar contest over the direction of government and civil soci-
ety is one of the primary influences shaping the course of religious
change in Indonesia and other parts of the Muslim world today. Some
contestants in this struggle reject religious "disesrablishmenr' and insist
on a direct and literal application of Islamic law to all aspects of gov-
ernment and social life. Others insist, wirh good reason I believe,
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that such a view distorts the historic understanding of law within
Islam, attributing a fixed and closed quality to Islamic law which the
tradition itself never had. For some such critics, then, the role of
Islam in a pluralistic era is to play a more general or abstract role, by
providing an ethos or spirit for public culture and government, not a
finished or closed blueprint.
Indonesian Pluralism
Relative to many other Muslim countries, what is remarkable about
the Indonesian case is that, at the moment, so many prominent Mus-
lim leaders support the pluralist understanding of religion rather than
the establishmentarian view. In part, I suspect, this reflects the rich
heritage of pluralism within Indonesian Islam. Though earlier 'West-
ern scholars once identified Indonesian Islam's most distinctive trait
as the strength of so-called "pre-Islamic" survivals (many of which
were actually Islamic), the more unusual feature of Indonesian Islam
is its remarkable and long established tradition of pluralism. Even in
an earlier era when virtually all Javanese, Malays, or Minangkabau
called themselves Muslims, for example, neither the courts nor the
'ulamL'exercised a total monopoly of power over the Muslim
community's moral and intellectual life. There were diverse religious
views even in premodern times, and diverse ways of being a good
Muslim. The reform movements of the past century have altered the
contours of Indonesia's klamic pluralism. But it is remarkable to see
how the community as a whole has eschewed totalizing answers and
single, all-powerful leaders. Though a few Muslim leaders occasion-
ally lament this pluralism, seeing it as fatal political weakness, from a
democratic perspective, this pluralism is really a blessing in disguise.
Much as in part of Western Europe in an earlier era, it has led
Indonesia's many Muslim leaders to the realization that the aspira-
tion for monopolistic unity must be renounced in favor of pluralism,
tolerance and the abstraction of Islam into a deeply pervasive civic
influence. Perhaps it is for this reason that at a recent conference I
attended on Islam in Bellagio, Italy, Leith Kubba, an Iraqi intellec-
tual who directs an influential Islamic Foundation in London, re-
marked, "'When I travel to Syria and Iraq I feel that I see Islam's past,
but when I travel to Indonesia, I feel that I see its future".
There are more contemporary influences on this Islamic tradition
of tolerance as well. The experience of Muslims since Indonesian in-
dependence has impressed upon many the dangers of politicizing re-
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ligion too directly. It was, after all, during the Old Order period,
when the religious issues were politicized to an extreme, that one
heard the loudest cries among some in the Javanist community for a
turning away from Islam. Similarly, it was in the aftermath of the
bloodshed of.7965-7966, that one saw some Muslims turn from Islam
to Hinduism and Christianity. Conversel/, these has been an un-
precedented deepening of Islamic piety since the 1980s, a period dur-
ing which political Islam has been far less influential than civic-cul-
tural hlam. It is clear that for some Indonesians this dampening po-
litical-religious passions, which is to say, the "desacralization" of cer-
tain kinds of. party politics, has allowed for a deeper Islamization of
society.
Though this historical experience may seem a fragile basis on which
to build a consensus for pluralism, it is exactly the kind of heritage
that promoted, and promotes, civic-pluralist ideologies in the \fesr,
where they exist. Conversely, where, as in some other'Western coun-
tries, such a pluralist precedent is lacking, we see quite clearly rhar
'Western 
societies can slip as easily as any other into civic and reli-
gious discord. As \forld War II, the contempor^ry tragedy of Bosnia,
and debates over the Muslim minority in certain Wesrern countries
all painfully illustrate, the struggle for pluralism is nor somerhing the
'West has today decisively resolved, it is a living, ongoing challenge.
Vhere the foundation for a civic-pluralism accommodation among
religions exists, however, it makes an enormous difference, making
easier the accommodation of new religious traditions, such as those
recently carried by new Muslim immigrants ro the Wesr. However
imperfect the achievement, the example reminds us rhar religious plu-
ralism and dissidence from established Churches in the early modern
era was a training ground in which narional communities learned to
live with pluralism and religious nonconformity. With its remark-
able pluralism and history of tolerance, Indonesia has the porenrial
of developing a civic pluralist tradition as well, one which could serve
as a remarkable example for the Muslim world 
-as well as rhe'Wesr.Let me return, finally, to secularization theory and modern reli-
gious change. '!flhat I have tried to suggesr is that we musr reject the
cruder versions of secularization theory, especially those that under-
stood secularization as an inevitable and universal process of religious
decline. While rejecting these ideas, however, I have suggested that
we should retain secularization theory's conviction that there are com-
monalities to religious change in the modern age, especially as regards
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two things: the widespread development of a non-magical and more
"abstracrn understanding of divinity-in-the-world, and discussions andl
or disputes over the role of religion in the nation. The former com-
-onaiity is related to the widespread influence of natural scientific
institutions in the modern world. The latter has to do with a develop-
ment of equally ubiquitous influence: the appearance of the modern
nation-state with its asociated machinery of communications, educa-
tion and markets, and its equally important concern for the shaping
of modern institutions and identities.
To put it a bit too simply, then, what I am suggesting here is that
the processes of modern religious change should, for some purposes'
be placed alongside or inside the phenomenon of the nation-build-
ing, rather than at its margins. Religion in the modern era is clearly
influenced by a variety of forces, but the development of pluralism
in the contest of the nation-state poses similar challenges for all world
religions. Though the precise role that religion comes to play in the
public world will, of course, vary, we can at the very least affirm
ihat, .ontrary to Gellner and some modernization theorists, there is
nothing improper or "countermodernizing" to those who insist that
religion has a vital role to play in modern national life (cf. Casanova
I9g4). At the same time, in the face of those who would press for the
imposition of a more monopolistic union of religion and state, we
should remind ourselves that the politicization of religion through
the suppression of pluralism has in the modern era been a consistent
catalyst for antireligious movements or, to borrow John Esposito's
phrase, "secularist fundamentalism." Modernization brings pluralism,
lnd pluralism presenrs believers with difficult but important choices.
In an era when certain wesrern and Muslim leaders speak of an inevi-
table "clash of civilizations", it is useful to remind ourselves of the
challenges we all face, and of the fact that there are many people of
good faith in the wesrern and Muslim worlds working for civic tol-
erance and pluralism.
Sndia hlamika, VoL 2, Na 4, 1995
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